* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
*/
+/* TODO:
+ * Useless stuff (because nothing depends on it):
+ * - non-nul key derivation rate
+ * - MKI payload
+ */
+
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include <config.h>
#endif
#include <gcrypt.h>
-#define debug( ... ) (void)0
+#ifdef WIN32
+# include <winsock2.h>
+#else
+# include <netinet/in.h>
+# include <pthread.h>
+GCRY_THREAD_OPTION_PTHREAD_IMPL;
+#endif
-/* TODO:
- * Useful stuff:
- * - ROC profile thingy (multicast really needs this)
- * - replay protection
- *
- * Useless stuff (because nothing depends on it):
- * - non-nul key derivation rate
- * - MKI payload
- */
+#define debug( ... ) (void)0
typedef struct srtp_proto_t
{
uint32_t rtcp_index;
uint32_t rtp_roc;
uint16_t rtp_seq;
+ uint16_t rtp_rcc;
uint8_t tag_len;
};
SRTCP_SALT
};
-#ifdef WIN32
-# include <winsock2.h>
-#else
-# include <netinet/in.h>
-# include <pthread.h>
-GCRY_THREAD_OPTION_PTHREAD_IMPL;
-#endif
+
+static inline unsigned rcc_mode (const srtp_session_t *s)
+{
+ return (s->flags >> 4) & 3;
+}
static bool libgcrypt_usable = false;
* internal cryptographic counters; it is however of course feasible to open
* multiple simultaneous sessions with the same master key.
*
- * @param name cipher-suite name
- * @param kdr key derivation rate
+ * @param encr encryption algorithm number
+ * @param auth authentication algortihm number
+ * @param tag_len authentication tag byte length (NOT including RCC)
* @param flags OR'ed optional flags.
*
* @return NULL in case of error
*/
srtp_session_t *
-srtp_create (const char *name, unsigned flags, unsigned kdr)
+srtp_create (int encr, int auth, unsigned tag_len, int prf, unsigned flags)
{
- assert (name != NULL);
+ if ((flags & ~SRTP_FLAGS_MASK) || init_libgcrypt ())
+ return NULL;
+
+ int cipher, md;
+ switch (encr)
+ {
+ case SRTP_ENCR_NULL:
+ cipher = GCRY_CIPHER_NONE;
+ break;
- if (kdr != 0)
- return NULL; // FIXME: KDR not implemented yet
+ case SRTP_ENCR_AES_CM:
+ cipher = GCRY_CIPHER_AES;
+ break;
- uint8_t tag_len;
- int cipher = GCRY_CIPHER_AES, md = GCRY_MD_SHA1;
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
- if (strcmp (name, "AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80") == 0)
- tag_len = 10;
- else
- if (strcmp (name, "AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_32") == 0)
- tag_len = 4;
- else
- // F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 is not implemented
+ switch (auth)
+ {
+ case SRTP_AUTH_NULL:
+ md = GCRY_MD_NONE;
+ break;
+
+ case SRTP_AUTH_HMAC_SHA1:
+ md = GCRY_MD_SHA1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (tag_len > gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (auth))
return NULL;
- if ((flags & ~SRTP_FLAGS_MASK) || init_libgcrypt ())
+ if (prf != SRTP_PRF_AES_CM)
return NULL;
srtp_session_t *s = malloc (sizeof (*s));
memset (s, 0, sizeof (*s));
s->flags = flags;
- s->kdr = kdr;
s->tag_len = tag_len;
+ s->rtp_rcc = 1; /* Default RCC rate */
+ if (rcc_mode (s))
+ {
+ if (tag_len < 4)
+ goto error;
+ }
if (proto_create (&s->rtp, cipher, md) == 0)
{
proto_destroy (&s->rtp);
}
+error:
free (s);
return NULL;
}
+/**
+ * Counter Mode encryption/decryption (ctr length = 16 bytes)
+ * with non-padded (truncated) text
+ */
+static int
+ctr_crypt (gcry_cipher_hd_t hd, const void *ctr, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const size_t ctrlen = 16;
+ div_t d = div (len, ctrlen);
+
+ if (gcry_cipher_setctr (hd, ctr, ctrlen)
+ || gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, data, d.quot * ctrlen, NULL, 0))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (d.rem)
+ {
+ /* Truncated last block */
+ uint8_t dummy[ctrlen];
+ data += d.quot * ctrlen;
+ memcpy (dummy, data, d.rem);
+ memset (dummy + d.rem, 0, ctrlen - d.rem);
+
+ if (gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, dummy, ctrlen, data, ctrlen))
+ return -1;
+ memcpy (data, dummy, d.rem);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
/**
* AES-CM key derivation (saltlen = 14 bytes)
*/
for (size_t i = 0; i < rlen; i++)
iv[sizeof (iv) - rlen + i] ^= r[i];
- /* TODO: retry with CTR mode */
- while (outlen >= sizeof (iv))
- {
- /* AES */
- if (gcry_cipher_encrypt (prf, out, sizeof (iv), iv, sizeof (iv)))
- return EINVAL;
- outlen -= sizeof (iv);
- out = ((uint8_t *)out) + sizeof (iv);
-
- /* Increment IV in network byte order */
- if (++iv[sizeof (iv) - 1] == 0)
- ++iv[sizeof (iv) -2];
- }
-
- if (outlen > 0)
- {
- /* Truncated last AES output block */
- if (gcry_cipher_encrypt (prf, iv, sizeof (iv), NULL, 0))
- return -1;
- memcpy (out, iv, outlen);
- }
-
- return 0;
+ memset (out, 0, outlen);
+ return ctr_crypt (prf, iv, out, outlen);
}
gcry_cipher_hd_t prf;
uint8_t r[6];
- /* TODO: retry with CTR mode */
- if (gcry_cipher_open (&prf, GCRY_CIPHER_AES, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_ECB, 0)
+ if (gcry_cipher_open (&prf, GCRY_CIPHER_AES, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CTR, 0)
|| gcry_cipher_setkey (prf, key, keylen))
return -1;
}
-/** AES-CM encryption/decryption (ctr length = 16 bytes) */
-static int
-ctr_crypt (gcry_cipher_hd_t hd, uint32_t *ctr, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+/**
+ * Sets Roll-over-Counter Carry (RCC) rate for the SRTP session. If not
+ * specified (through this function), the default rate of ONE is assumed
+ * (i.e. every RTP packets will carry the RoC). RCC rate is ignored if none
+ * of the RCC mode has been selected.
+ *
+ * The RCC mode is selected through one of these flags for srtp_create():
+ * SRTP_RCC_MODE1: integrity protection only for RoC carrying packets
+ * SRTP_RCC_MODE2: integrity protection for all packets
+ * SRTP_RCC_MODE3: no integrity protection
+ *
+ * RCC mode 3 is insecure. Compared to plain RTP, it provides confidentiality
+ * (through encryption) but is much more prone to DoS. It can only be used if
+ * anti-spoofing protection is provided by lower network layers (e.g. IPsec,
+ * or trusted routers and proper source address filtering).
+ *
+ * If RCC rate is 1, RCC mode 1 and 2 are functionally identical.
+ *
+ * @param rate RoC Carry rate (MUST NOT be zero)
+ */
+void srtp_setrcc_rate (srtp_session_t *s, uint16_t rate)
{
- const size_t ctrlen = 16;
- while (len >= ctrlen)
- {
- if (gcry_cipher_setctr (hd, ctr, ctrlen)
- || gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, data, ctrlen, NULL, 0))
- return -1;
-
- data += ctrlen;
- len -= ctrlen;
- ctr[3] = htonl (ntohl (ctr[3]) + 1);
- }
-
- if (len > 0)
- {
- /* Truncated last block */
- uint8_t dummy[ctrlen];
- memcpy (dummy, data, len);
- memset (dummy + len, 0, ctrlen - len);
-
- if (gcry_cipher_setctr (hd, ctr, ctrlen)
- || gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, dummy, ctrlen, data, ctrlen))
- return -1;
- memcpy (data, dummy, len);
- }
-
- return 0;
+ assert (rate != 0);
+ s->rtp_rcc = rate;
}
/** Message Authentication and Integrity for RTP */
static const uint8_t *
-rtp_digest (srtp_session_t *s, const uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+rtp_digest (srtp_session_t *s, const uint8_t *data, size_t len,
+ uint32_t roc)
{
const gcry_md_hd_t md = s->rtp.mac;
- uint32_t roc = htonl (srtp_compute_roc (s, rtp_seq (data)));
gcry_md_reset (md);
gcry_md_write (md, data, len);
- gcry_md_write (md, &roc, 4);
+ gcry_md_write (md, &(uint32_t){ htonl (roc) }, 4);
return gcry_md_read (md, 0);
}
*
* @return 0 on success, in case of error:
* EINVAL malformatted RTP packet
+ * EACCES replayed packet or out-of-window or sync lost
*/
static int srtp_crypt (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t len)
{
memcpy (&ssrc, buf + 8, 4);
/* Updates ROC and sequence (it's safe now) */
- if (roc > s->rtp_roc)
+ int16_t diff = seq - s->rtp_seq;
+ if (diff > 0)
+ {
+ /* Sequence in the future, good */
+ s->rtp.window = s->rtp.window << diff;
+ s->rtp.window |= 1;
s->rtp_seq = seq, s->rtp_roc = roc;
+ }
else
- if (seq > s->rtp_seq)
- s->rtp_seq = seq;
+ {
+ /* Sequence in the past/present, bad */
+ diff = -diff;
+ if ((diff >= 64) || ((s->rtp.window >> diff) & 1))
+ return EACCES; /* Replay attack */
+ s->rtp.window |= 1 << diff;
+ }
/* Encrypt/Decrypt */
if (s->flags & SRTP_UNENCRYPTED)
*
* @param buf RTP packet to be encrypted/digested
* @param lenp pointer to the RTP packet length on entry,
- * set to the SRTP length on exit (undefined in case of error)
+ * set to the SRTP length on exit (undefined on non-ENOSPC error)
* @param bufsize size (bytes) of the packet buffer
*
* @return 0 on success, in case of error:
* EINVAL malformatted RTP packet or internal error
- * ENOSPC bufsize is too small (to add authentication tag)
+ * ENOSPC bufsize is too small to add authentication tag
+ * (<lenp> will hold the required byte size)
+ * EACCES packet would trigger a replay error on receiver
*/
int
srtp_send (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t *lenp, size_t bufsize)
if (!(s->flags & SRTP_UNAUTHENTICATED))
{
- if (bufsize < (len + s->tag_len))
+ size_t tag_len = s->tag_len;
+ *lenp = len + tag_len;
+ if (bufsize < (len + tag_len))
return ENOSPC;
- const uint8_t *tag = rtp_digest (s, buf, len);
- memcpy (buf + len, tag, s->tag_len);
- *lenp = len + s->tag_len;
+ uint32_t roc = srtp_compute_roc (s, rtp_seq (buf));
+ const uint8_t *tag = rtp_digest (s, buf, len, roc);
+ if (rcc_mode (s))
+ {
+ assert (s->rtp_rcc);
+ if ((rtp_seq (buf) % s->rtp_rcc) == 0)
+ {
+ memcpy (buf + len, &(uint32_t){ htonl (s->rtp_roc) }, 4);
+ len += 4;
+ if (rcc_mode (s) == 3)
+ tag_len = 0;
+ else
+ tag_len -= 4;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (rcc_mode (s) & 1)
+ tag_len = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy (buf + len, tag, tag_len);
}
return 0;
srtp_recv (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t *lenp)
{
size_t len = *lenp;
- /* FIXME: anti-replay */
+ if (len < 12u)
+ return EINVAL;
if (!(s->flags & SRTP_UNAUTHENTICATED))
{
- if (len < (12u + s->tag_len))
+ size_t tag_len = s->tag_len, roc_len = 0;
+ if (rcc_mode (s))
+ {
+ if ((rtp_seq (buf) % s->rtp_rcc) == 0)
+ {
+ roc_len = 4;
+ if (rcc_mode (s) == 3)
+ tag_len = 0;
+ else
+ tag_len -= 4;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (rcc_mode (s) & 1)
+ tag_len = 0; // RCC mode 1 or 3: no auth
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (len < (12u + roc_len + tag_len))
return EINVAL;
- len -= s->tag_len;
+ len -= roc_len + tag_len;
+
+ uint32_t roc = srtp_compute_roc (s, rtp_seq (buf)), rcc;
+ if (roc_len)
+ {
+ assert (roc_len == 4);
+ memcpy (&rcc, buf + len, 4);
+ rcc = ntohl (rcc);
+ }
+ else
+ rcc = roc;
- const uint8_t *tag = rtp_digest (s, buf, len);
- if (memcmp (buf + len, tag, s->tag_len))
+ const uint8_t *tag = rtp_digest (s, buf, len, rcc);
+ if (memcmp (buf + len + roc_len, tag, s->tag_len))
return EACCES;
+ if (roc_len)
+ {
+ /* Authenticated packet carried a Roll-Over-Counter */
+ s->rtp_roc += rcc - roc;
+ assert (srtp_compute_roc (s, rtp_seq (buf)) == rcc);
+ }
*lenp = len;
}
if ((len < 12) || ((buf[0] >> 6) != 2))
return EINVAL;
- /* Updates SRTCP index (safe here) */
uint32_t index;
memcpy (&index, buf + len, 4);
index = ntohl (index);
- if (((index - s->rtcp_index) & 0x7fffffff) < 0x40000000)
- s->rtcp_index = index; /* Update index */
+ if (((index >> 31) != 0) != ((s->flags & SRTCP_UNENCRYPTED) == 0))
+ return EINVAL; // E-bit mismatch
+
+ index &= ~(1 << 31); // clear E-bit for counter
+
+ /* Updates SRTCP index (safe here) */
+ int32_t diff = index - s->rtcp_index;
+ if (diff > 0)
+ {
+ /* Packet in the future, good */
+ s->rtcp.window = s->rtcp.window << diff;
+ s->rtcp.window |= 1;
+ s->rtcp_index = index;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Packet in the past/present, bad */
+ diff = -diff;
+ if ((diff >= 64) || ((s->rtcp.window >> diff) & 1))
+ return EACCES; // replay attack!
+ s->rtp.window |= 1 << diff;
+ }
/* Crypts SRTCP */
if (s->flags & SRTCP_UNENCRYPTED)
srtcp_recv (srtp_session_t *s, uint8_t *buf, size_t *lenp)
{
size_t len = *lenp;
- /* FIXME: anti-replay ?? */
if (len < (4u + s->tag_len))
return EINVAL;